Psych Gripes 1: Two Biggies
Let the kvetching commence!
But before that happens, here’s the introductory post to this series, explaining why I’m bothering. My understanding of the history etc. addressed may be misguided and/or lacking; substantive comments are welcome.
Gripe 1: Insufficient Differentiation
Psychology as a distinct academic field sprang from two parents: philosophy and biology. Very broadly, philosophy asked many questions and made many assumptions that focused on human functioning or the lack thereof in some way. Biology furnished it with scientific methods, which also included some assumptions that don’t apply so well to the social sciences. Once it was deemed safe1 to explore psychological questions scientifically, it began in a typically ad hoc way. That’s typical of the human quest of discovery and development, so it probably isn’t helping my position to decry it straight off, but I think it’s particularly important for psychology.
Psychophysics highlights my gripe quite well. In trying to identify and quantify minimum amounts of physical stimulation required to yield a perceptual experience or a change in one, empirical methods ran in to problems: it was very difficult to control and quantify relevant variables sufficiently; and the subjects themselves introduced variability. Turns out that psychophysical limits are very sensitive to environmental and individual differences. Alas, that didn’t appreciably change enough in psychophysics to move the new discipline to more solid footing.
Humans aren’t nearly as similar and predictable as, say, carbon atoms or maple leaves placed in a specific set of conditions. This fundamental truth is not presented nor discussed nearly enough in textbooks and classrooms.
Gripe 2: Two Dangerous –isms
In the way the history of psychology was taught to me2, philosophical assumptions were presented as explicitly that: placeholder theories until better thinking or empirical evidence came along that required changes. Philosophers probably varied substantially in their embrace of that position, however; people believe what they believe for what they think are sound reasons, and it can take a lot to persuade a person to change their mind. It’s possible that differences in this aspect of personality may have led to differences in people’s willingness to question or reject these assumptions, but we can’t know today how much of an influence it was on the philosophers or their adherents. The best we can do is point to our current understanding of social psychology3 and acknowledge the possible influences of conformity and the desire to be part of an in-group.
Early psychological work was influenced a lot by 17th-century philosophy; perhaps no one was more influential than René Descartes. The two –isms that are always atop my list of gripes trace directly to him.
The first is rationalism. It’s generally defined as the belief that reasoning is the best and/or most important way of acquiring knowledge, in contrast to other means such as tradition, direct experience, or faith. Those who understand the origins of Sigmund Freud’s psychosexual theory of personality development at least a little should easily see the problem with rationalism. It shouldn’t take too much thinking to generalize from Freudian theory to other, more cherished theories.
The second objectionable –ism is dualism. Descartes’ belief that the mind and the body are separate entities with separate functions has been the source of a raft of enduring, serious problems, many of which will be detailed in future psych gripes. It’s the source of the biggest problems in cognitive psychology today, and I’m close to despairing that it will never be rejected.
Conclusion
My understanding of the development of the physical sciences is that as methodologies developed that allowed it, each moved out of the realm of philosophy and into their own discipline. So perhaps it’s unreasonable of me to object to psychology following the same course. It’s partly because of the findings in early psychophysics research and the unwillingness to reject rationalism and/or dualism in pursuit of a different way of conceptualizing and understanding them that I’m unwilling to be more malleable on the point.
Psychology’s first steps set it on a problematic path. As a whole, it hasn’t corrected that, largely because of the persistence of rationalism and dualism. Flaws in my arguments and/or evidence that provides reason to think that I’m wrong are welcome, when presented respectfully.
1: primarily by the dominant christian factions of the day (back to the paragraph)
2: almost all in graduate school courses; I don’t know how much of an influence that has on my thinking (back to the paragraph)
3: although doing so is itself a gripe that I’ll get to at some point (back to the paragraph)
Psych Gripes: Introduction and Overview – WordPlay
July 4, 2025 @ 4:07 pm
[…] PG 1: Two Biggies — insufficient differentiation; and my first go at rationalism and mind–body dualism […]
July 5, 2025 @ 5:40 pm
I’ll need to think about this post before replying further. However, it’s my understanding that at least some psychologists have worked hard to overcome mind-body dualism. Our old friend J.J. Gibson might be one, in the sense that he and his wife Eleanor looked at how animals live in and interact with their surroundings. Another intriguing line of thought is what’s called embodied cognition, for instance in Anthony Chemero’s book Radical Embodied Cognitive Science (which I have not yet read). I’m sure there are others, but I’m not familiar with the relevant scientific literature.
July 6, 2025 @ 7:16 am
The Gibsons did indeed reject dualism. Depending on what year one considers the start of psychology as a science, that came 80–100 years later. If intro psych textbooks are a good judge of their influence, not much has changed as a result. James’ ecological theory is rarely cited. Eleanor’s famous visual cliff experiments get more attention; it isn’t uncommon for them to be explained in terms of information-processing (IP) theory though.
True embodied psychology can be (and should be) viewed as a logical extension of the Gibsons’ work, yet it too is often presented using IP terminology. That approach still dominates psychology, and it comes directly from Descartes’ ideas. That is my primary point in this post: as a field, psychology hasn’t rejected fundamental assumptions that severely limit its usefulness.